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DECRIMINALIZING STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
Dean Hill Rivkin1
A man should be able to find an education by taking the broad highway. He
should not have to take by-roads through the woods and follow winding trails
through sharp thickets, in constant tension because of the pitfalls and traps,
and, after years of effort, perhaps attain the threshold of his goal when he is
past caring about it.2

I.

INTRODUCTION

The criminalization of students for school-related misconduct has burgeoned into a
major national issue.3 The issue embodies serious questions about crime and punishment,
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her consummate lawyering in this case, her profound insights into the issues discussed in this article, and her
passionate dedication to the interests of students with disabilities. I also benefited from the knowledge of attorney
Barbara Dyer of UT College of Law’s CAN-LEARN Project, who has consistently walked the walk on behalf of
students with disabilities who are unjustly treated by school systems. Similar thanks are due to Eileen Ordover,
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discipline and fairness, disability and difference, and educational adequacy and dysfunction.
This article centers on what started as an ordinary case of special education—named Chris
L.4—that transformed into a national cause.5 The case focused on the legal limitations that
govern school systems when they seek to prosecute students with disabilities in juvenile court
for school misconduct. Now is a propitious time to revisit the Chris L. case.

Chris L. stands as an important historical guidepost to the current efforts to derail the
school-to-prison-pipeline both for students with disabilities and for all students at risk of
educational distress. Chris L. was a middle school student who was diagnosed by his doctor
as having Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (AD/HD). He was struggling in school ,
both academically and behaviorally. Despite knowledge of Chris’s problems, his school
system did not evaluate him for possible certification under special education laws. He was
involved in an incident in a school bathroom where he was accused of kicking a pipe and
causing water damage. The school system promptly filed a juvenile court petition again Chris
for criminal vandalism. Years of successful litigation ensued. The vivid facts of the Chris L.
case and its nonpunitive, child-centered judicial opinions make this case a gateway for
understanding and stemming the over-criminalization of students. In today’s climate, in which
over-criminalization and push-out of students by schools is being viewed as
counterproductive to sound educational practice and inimical to the human and civil rights of

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Thomas, who has urged a drastic hands-off approach by courts
in school matters, cited instances of criminalization of students by schools that he termed “controversial.”
4
Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), aff’d, 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1271 (1997).
5
For an incisive analysis of the ethics of everyday practice, see David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the
Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68 (Austin
Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
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students,6 the lessons of Chris L. can be universalized to all students enmeshed in the pipeline,
regardless of their disability status.

This article will first chronicle the evolution of methods of school exclusion under the
Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Next, an in-depth account of the Chris
L. case will disclose the manifold tensions that arise when IDEA rights are asserted to defend
against a central tactic of school exclusion: criminalization of students with disabilities for
behaviors that are a manifestation of their disorders. The article concludes with an analysis of
the governing IDEA rules and their deployment to stem the use of criminalization by schools.

II.

SPECIAL EDUCATION: LEGALIZATION AND RESISTANCE

Chris L. was a salient special education case. It involved issues of conduct and
misconduct that have been perennially divisive in school systems across the country. As Chris
L. shows, a host of inequalities pervade the field of special education. A concise discussion of
two prominent themes in the history of the IDEA provides necessary context for a reexamination of the Chris L. litigation and an argument for its universal application to all
students.

A.

Legalization: Protecting Rights

The IDEA was enacted in 1975. In its findings, Congress noted that “1,000,000 of the
children with disabilities in the United States were excluded entirely from the public school

6

See Dean Hill Rivkin, Legal Advocacy and Education Reform: Litigating School Exclusion, 75
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system and do not go through the educational process with their peers.”7 To redress this
problem, the Act “ensure[d] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free
appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed
to meet their unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living.”8 To
achieve this goal, Congress conferred a panoply of rights on children with disabilities and their
parents to aid them in their disputes with school systems.9

The scheme that Congress enacted to promote these ends and to protect the
educational rights of children with disabilities rested on a dense thicket of procedural
protections.10 This scheme was designed to assure that parents of students with disabilities
have enforceable opportunities to participate in all aspects of educational decision-making for
their child.11 The aptly named due process hearing was the centerpiece for resolving special
education disputes. The scheme was constructed to curtail severely the virtually unfettered
discretion formerly enjoyed by school administrators in educating (or not) students with
disabilities. The IDEA was a crowning achievement of legal liberalism.

Significant scholarly critiques of the regime of rights embodied in IDEA emerged.
David Neal and David Kirp posited that the rights-based IDEA safeguards impeded
cooperative decision-making between parents and schools.12 Joel Handler portrayed the
failure of the due process model for parents who have little sophistication in educational

7

20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(C) (2006).
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006).
9
20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (2006).
10
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006).
11
See, Donna L. Terman et al., Special Education for Students with Disabilities: Analysis and
Recommendations, 6 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15 (1996), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/future
ofchildren/publications/docs/06_01_Analysis.pdf.
12
David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The Case of Special Education,
8
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advocacy and little access to legal representation.13 Martha Minow analyzed the contradictory
goals embedded within the IDEA and critiqued the “partial approach of litigation” in cases
involving “disfavored” people.14

In light of the critiques of the IDEA’s efficacy, it is no small irony that parents who
have been able to enforce their children’s rights in court have fared exceptionally well on
traditional criteria.15 Since 1983, the United States Supreme Court has decided eleven IDEA
cases involving individual disputes between children and their schools.16 In nine of these
cases, the Court substantially upheld claims that the school system was not providing
adequate services or protections to children with disabilities. In these cases, the Court has
displayed great deference both to the expansive remedial intentions of Congress and to the
choices made by parents seeking to secure educational and treatment services for their
children. The Court has been distinctly unsympathetic to arguments by school systems that

48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1985).
13
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION, AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY BUREAUCRACY (1986).
14
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 35-39,
350-72 (1990). In special education, parents often focus on relationships rather than rights, see David M. Engel,
Essay: Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference,
1991 DUKE L.J. 166 (1991).
15
Attorneys for school systems view the process of litigation under the IDEA as overly cumbersome,
dominated by sophisticated parents and their experienced counsel, and in need of major reform. Kevin J. Lanigan,
Rose Marie L. Audette, Alexander E. Dreier & Maya R. Kobersy, Nasty, Brutish . . . and Often Not Very Short:
The Attorney Perspective on Due Process, in THOMAS B. FORDHAM FOUNDATION & THE PROGRESSIVE POLICY
INSTITUTE, RETHINKING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 213 (2001). But see PRESIDENT’S COMM’N
ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES 8 (2002) (Parents of children with special education needs “often do not feel they are empowered when
the system fails them.”).
16
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 2484 (2009); Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Arlington Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006);
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005); Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U.S. 66
(1999); Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7 (1993); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1 (1993); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988); Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985);
Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883 (1984); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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either the lack of available resources or traditional educational considerations limit their ability
to fulfill the obligations imposed by the IDEA.17

B.

Resistance: Disciplinary Exclusion

From its enactment, school systems resisted—mostly in low-visibility ways—the
restraints placed on their autonomy by the IDEA.18 The exclusion of behaviorally problematic
students from school has been a long-standing phenomenon in school systems.19 This history
of exclusion precipitated the enactment of the IDEA in 1975. One of two foundational cases
cited in the legislative history of the IDEA, Mills v. Board of Education of the District of
Columbia,20 provided relief on equal protection grounds to seven “exceptional” children with
behavioral disorders who challenged their exclusion from the public schools of the District of
Columbia. These students, who were deemed behavior problems, suffered from mental
retardation, emotional disturbance, or hyperactivity. They ranged in age from eight to sixteen.
Pleading lack of funding from Congress, the school system argued that diverting more money
to special education would be “inequitable” to students not qualifying for these services.

Mills and a similar case from Pennsylvania on behalf of mentally retarded children who
were also excluded from school because of their challenging behaviors21 led to the zero-reject
principle embodied in the IDEA. Congress especially targeted students with mental or

17

The most recent example is the Forest Grove case, 129 S.Ct. 2484, where the Court, over strong fiscal
arguments by school systems, rejected claims that Congress intended that parents place a child in an inappropriate
public school school setting before seeking reimbursement for a private placement.
18
The grand intentions of educators that IDEA would lead to individualized learning plans for all students
were short-lived. See Richard A. Weatherley & Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional
Innovation: Instituting Special Education Reform, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 176, 196 (1977).
19
See Mitchell L. Yell, David Rogers & Elisabeth Rogers Lodge, The Legal History of Special Education,
19 REMEDIAL & SPECIAL EDUC. 219, 220 (1998).
20
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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emotional disabilities for assistance.22 This assistance includes a plan of individualized
instruction (the individualized education plan or IEP) and support services designed to benefit
the student’s learning and behavior at school. The IDEA also specifies a regime of procedural
safeguards—including notice and an opportunity to contest proposed alterations in a disabled
student’s educational program—to ensure meaningful parental participation in the special
education process. These “procedural safeguards” tangibly limit the formerly unchecked
discretion that school systems exercised to remove special education students who misbehave.

Thirteen years after the enactment of the IDEA, the United States Supreme Court
confronted claims by a California school system that the IDEA hamstrung its efforts to deal
with students whose disruptive and violent behaviors created risks of harm to themselves and
their classmates and teachers. In Honig v. Doe, the San Francisco Unified School District
sought to expel indefinitely two emotionally disturbed students for engaging in dangerous
conduct at school.23 John Doe assaulted another student at the developmental center that both
students attended. He was the target of teasing and ridicule by his peers (bullying), and his
IEP sought to assist him when he confronted frustrating situations. As recounted in the
Court’s majority decision:
On November 6, 1980, Doe responded to the taunts of a fellow student in precisely the
explosive manner anticipated by his IEP: he choked the student with sufficient force to
leave abrasions on the child’s neck, and kicked out a school window while being
escorted to the principal’s office afterwards. Doe admitted his misconduct, and the
principal recommended expulsion. Challenging his exclusion as a violation of the
IDEA, the district court ordered the school district to return Doe to his school,
following 24 days of expulsion.24

21

Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
The IDEA legislative history revealed that the needs of children with emotional disabilities were
substantially unmet. S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 8 (1975).
23
484 U.S. 305 (1988).
24
Id. at 313.
22
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Jack Smith was also identified by the school system as emotionally disturbed. He showed a
propensity for verbal hostility and physical aggression. He suffered from extreme hyperactivity
and low self-esteem. He was impulsive, anxious, and easily distracted. His behavior at school
included stealing, extorting money from fellow students, and making sexual comments to
female classmates. When his behaviors persisted, the system sought his expulsion. He received
home instruction until he re-entered school by order of the district court.

Justice Brennan majority opinion first recounted the clear Congressional intent to
require school systems, who receive IDEA funding, to serve even the most difficult students.
Recounting the history of exclusion of students with mental and emotional disabilities from
schools--the literal “warehousing” of students in separate schools or classes or the system’s
neglect of students until they dropped out of school--the decision emphasized the complex
scheme of procedural safeguards designed to ensure that students with disabilities be
“mainstreamed,” not segregated, to the maximum extent appropriate. Justice Brennan also
highlighted the critical role that Congress intended parents to play in formulating their child’s
educational program. This collaborative process was a vast departure from the status quo,
where school systems enjoyed considerable discretion to exclude disabled students from
school, often indefinitely. The IDEA, a rights-based scheme, ushered in a new era where each
student was guaranteed an opportunity to remain in school.

Citing the “unequivocal” language of section 1415(e)(3) of the IDEA, which
prescribed that, during the IDEA review process, students are entitled to “stay-put” in their
then current educational placement, the Supreme Court25 rejected the urging of the school
25

Justice Scalia and Justice O’Connor dissented on mootness grounds. Id. at 332 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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systems to read a “dangerousness” exception into the stay-put provision of IDEA.26 The
schools argued that Congress did not include such an exception either because it was too
“obvious for comment” or because Congress inadvertently omitted this authority, an oversight
that the Court should correct.27 Citing Mills as a major source of guidance for Congress,
Justice Brennan surveyed the IDEA to demonstrate Congress’ insistence that students with
emotional disabilities be educated regardless of their difficult and disruptive behaviors:
We think it clear, however, that Congress very much meant to strip school systems of
the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students,
particularly emotionally disabled students, from school. In doing so, Congress did not
leave administrators powerless to deal with dangerous students; it did, however, deny
school officials their former right to “self-help,” and directed that in the future the
removal of disabled students could be accomplished only with the permission of the
parents or, as a last resort, the courts.28

Justice Brennan also detailed the various educational methods, and administrative and judicial
routes, that school systems can pursue to deal with the problem of dangerous behavior. The
plea by the schools to be accorded more discretion was soundly rebuffed.

By the 1990’s, school systems began engaging in a second wave of disciplinary
exclusion. Seeking to remove difficult children from school, and be relieved of the
responsibilities of complying with the provisions of the IDEA that required school systems to
continue to educate students with disabilities even after they were expelled for misconduct,
school systems devised three strategies. One was to deny IDEA eligibility to students with
mental and emotional disabilities and pursue expulsion on the same basis as students in what is
called regular education.29 A second was to continue educational services but in a segregated

26

Id. at 323.
Id.
28
Id. at 323-24 (emphasis in original).
29
See MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT
OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 109-10 (1997).
27
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setting.30 The third was to prosecute students with disabilities by filing juvenile court
petitions. The Chris L. case challenged this latter practice.

III.

CHRIS L. V. KNOX COUNTY SCHOOLS:
AN ARRESTING CASE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
A.

A Child’s History

On May 11, 1993, Chris L., a fourteen-year-old eighth grader at Northwest Middle
School in Knoxville Tennessee, allegedly kicked and broke a pipe in a school bathroom. The
Principal estimated that water from the ruptured pipe caused approximately $800 in damage.
Chris was in the bathroom with another boy, Jonathan W. Both were eighth graders and were
not authorized to be in this bathroom, which was reserved for sixth graders. Following the
incident, the Principal called Chris’ mother to pick him up. When she arrived, she was told
that Chris was suspended for three days. She was directed to attend a “disciplinary” meeting
on May 17th.

The next day, the school system, through a security officer, filed a petition against
both boys in the local Juvenile Court. The petition stated:
Petitioner avers that said child is delinquent or unruly and in need of treatment or
rehabilitation, or dependent or neglected within the meaning of the law of the State of
Tennessee in that said child did on May 11, 1993, commit the offense of vandalism, in
that said child, along with Jonathan [W.] did kick and burst a main water line pipe in a
bathroom at Northwest Middle School in Knox County, Tenn.31

The L. family did not learn of the filing of the petition until the May 17th meeting.

30

Daniel J. Losen & Kevin G. Wellner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: Comprehensive
Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Education Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (2001).
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The case of Chris L. did not begin with the filing of the juvenile court petition. A
sensible starting point would be 1986, when Chris’ father, Mike L., first became concerned
about his progress in school. By the time that he was in the fourth grade, Chris received Ds in
his coursework and, according to his father, “[h]is conduct was very unsatisfactory.”32 This
pattern continued in the fifth grade. During the school year, at the initiation of school
personnel, Chris was tested by a school psychologist to determine if he was eligible for
services under the federal special education laws. Although he was deemed ineligible, the
school set up a contract system to assist Chris with his grades and his behavior. His parents
were an integral part of this system. Under this plan, Chris’ behavior and schoolwork
improved slightly.

In the fall of 1990, Chris began sixth grade at Northwest Middle School. His grades
were Ds and Fs, and his behavior was no better. At some sacrifice, Chris’ parents enrolled him
in a program at the Sylvan Learning Center, where, with individualized attention, he appeared
to make small strides in several of his subjects. Nevertheless, Chris “failed” the sixth grade
and was told that he would have to repeat it. When he returned the next school year, 1991-92,
Chris was inexplicably placed in the seventh grade, where he remained. His grades remained
low and his behavior was a concern for the entire school year. At one point, the Principal
sought permission from Chris’ parents to paddle him when he misbehaved. They refused their
permission.

31

Petition at 1, In re Chris L. (Knox County, Tenn. Juvenile Court May 12, 1993) (on file with author).
Transcript at 100, Chris L. v. Knox County School System (Tenn. Dep’t of Educ. June 28, 1993)
[hereinafter Due Process Hearing Transcript] (on file with author).

32
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In the late spring of 1992, Chris’ parents met with the school psychologist, a school
counselor, and the Principal. The school psychologist reported that Chris’ teachers
unanimously had identified a set of problematic characteristics. These were: “Hard to follow
instructions, fails to finish, short attention span, frequent activity shifts, excessive talking,
often does not listen, often loses things.”33 Chris was identified as impulsive, someone who
“acts before thinking.”34 The school psychologist suggested that Chris likely suffered from
AD/HD and recommended that Chris be tested by his doctor. Within a week, Chris’
pediatrician had diagnosed him with this disorder and prescribed the medication Ritalin. Mike
L. hand-delivered a letter to the Principal explaining the diagnosis and the need to administer
the medication during school.

Despite the diagnosis and medication, Chris did not fare any better when he returned
for the 1992-93 school year. This was Chris’ final year at Northwest Middle School. By midyear, Chris’ school performance and behavior had deteriorated further. His grades were all Fs
and Ds, and he was in a cycle of misbehavior that worsened as time went on. His disciplinary
record revealed the following infractions:

33

Throwing pencils

Out of place (in hallway without permission)

Refusing to do work

Refusing to abide by “civil rules of behavior”

Throwing a watch
Refusing to sit in seat

Refusing to sit down
Too talkative

Horse-playing

Didn’t do work

Clowning in class
Late to class

Wandering off
Unruly scene

Talking out

Arguing with teacher in class

Not doing work

Throwing airplane in class

Id. at 117.
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In early February, Chris was suspended out-of-school first for three and then for two
days. When Chris returned, his father was told by the Assistant Principal that he had
instructions from the Principal to suspend Chris for the rest of the school year. Mike L.
pleaded with the Assistant Principal, telling him that Chris was scheduled to see his
pediatrician to adjust his medication. Chris won a reprieve. At Mike L.’s insistent urgings, the
school initiated its own evaluation pursuant to the IDEA.

Despite the on-going evaluation, Chris received no interventions—such as a behavior
management plan—from the school. During this time period, Chris received 33 “demerits,”
was suspended for five days out-of-school (making a total of twelve for the school year), and
eight days of in-school suspension. Before imposition of these disciplinary actions, the school
did not consult with Chris’ parents about these disciplinary actions or conduct a manifestation
hearing to determine the relationship between Chris’ behaviors and his AD/HD. The school
counselor suggested that Mike L. seek private counseling for Chris. Using his private health
insurance, Mike L. arranged for Chris to see a local psychologist with expertise in AD/HD.

By May 11, 1993, the date of the incident in the bathroom, the school had not
informed the family that the IDEA evaluation was complete. No M-team meeting to consider
Chris’ eligibility under the IDEA had been scheduled.35 When the L. family arrived for the
meeting on May 17th, they were informed that the session would constitute an M-team
meeting, in addition to a meeting to consider discipline for Chris. Those present at the

34

Id.
In Tennessee at the time, an M-team was a “Multidisciplinary team” meeting. These meetings are now
called Individualized Education Program Team (IEP Team) meetings under the IDEA. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.321
(2007). States differ in their terminology for these legally compelled gatherings of administrators, teachers, experts,
and parents (and the child at the discretion of the parents).
35
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meeting included the school Principal, the school psychologist, the counselor, and a teacher.
Preliminarily, the group agreed that Chris was eligible for IDEA certification under the
category of “Other Health Impairment,” the catch-all category for students whose disabilities
did not fit into IDEA’s other, more specific categories. Following this determination by the
M-team, the Principal said that he was considering suspending Chris for the rest of the school
year. When Mike L. objected, the school psychologist suggested that, instead of suspension,
Chris be placed in a separate “resource” class for the rest of the year. No recommendation on
discipline emerged.

Next, the M-team considered whether Chris’ action in the bathroom was a
manifestation of his disability. Although no formal decision was made, there was sentiment
expressed that a manifestation existed. The Principal then called Chris into the room. He
asked Chris why he was in the sixth grade bathroom. As one of the smallest boys in the eighth
grade, Chris explained that boys picked on him when he was in the eighth grade bathroom.
The Principal lamented that Chris had not told him of this problem so that he could rectify it.
The meeting concluded with no discussion of the Juvenile Court petition that had been filed.

Several days later, following a conversation with the father of the other boy in the
bathroom, Mike L. called the Principal and made him an offer. He said that the two families
would split the $799 in damage that was caused in the bathroom.36 The Principal was
receptive and replied that he would “see what he could do.” He called back later in the day
and told Mike L. that he could not drop the Juvenile Court charges. It was “out of his hands.”

36

Neither boy confessed to having kicked the pipe. Instead, they pointed the finger at each other.
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B.

Seeking Redress

Mike L. was incensed that the school had neglected Chris for as long as it did. He
attributed much of Chris’ misbehavior to the school’s failure to address Chris’ AD/HD. He
also expressed genuine frustration that the Principal did not accept what he considered to be a
fair offer to compensate the school in exchange for the dismissal of the Knox County Juvenile
Court charge. He did not want Chris to have anything to do with the Juvenile Court, because
he believed that the Juvenile Court was unresponsive, uncaring, and punitive. This belief was
confirmed by his initial unsatisfactory meeting with a Juvenile Court staff worker, who
refused to drop the petition despite the progress that was made at the May 17th meeting.

A trial in the Juvenile Court was scheduled for early July. Mike L. also complained
about having to pay for the services of the Sylvan Learning Center and the clinical
psychologist. Additionally, he wanted Chris’ school disciplinary record expunged.

Mike L. rejected the option of appearing in the Juvenile Court and seeking dismissal of
the charges. He was concerned that, if the case was not dismissed, and probation was
ordered, a likely outcome in this Court, Chris would face conditions of probation that would
pro forma carry a stipulation that the child exhibit good behavior in school. If this condition
was violated, violation of probation proceedings could be instituted, with potentially serious
consequences. He concluded that filing Due Process litigation was the preferable route of
recourse. Mike L. also believed that, after talking to other parents of children with AD/HD,
he did not want to see the school system shirk its responsibilities by “dumping” children with
behavioral problems into juvenile court.
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C.

Due Process

The decision to file for a due process hearing under IDEA was settled. Mike L. did
not want to risk the vicissitudes of the Juvenile Court. He took comfort in the 45-day
timeframe prescribed by the U.S. Department of Education for deciding due process cases
and insisted that it be adhered to. Additionally, he was swayed by the prospect of recovering
his out-of-pocket costs for psychological treatment and tutoring should he prevail in the
hearing.

Under the IDEA, filing for a request for a due process hearing is relatively simple. On
June 4, 1993, a due process request letter was sent to the school superintendent specifying the
grounds for a hearing and the relief requested. This triggered the appointment of an ALJ from
the panel of private attorneys maintained by the State Department of Education. The ALJ was
a well-regarded criminal defense lawyer from Nashville. In a conference call, the ALJ
scheduled the hearing for June 28th.

It was determined that the only two witnesses for the L. family would be Dr. Lance
Laurence, Chris’ treating psychologist, and Mike L. Chris himself would not testify. The
theory of the case was straightforward. Mike L. was entitled to reimbursement for the
expenses that he had laid out since the school system had failed to evaluate and certify Chris
in a timely fashion as required by the IDEA regulations. Regarding the Juvenile Court
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petition, it was argued that the IDEA requires a manifestation hearing prior to filing a juvenile
court petition because such a petition caused a change of placement.37

Prior to the due process hearing, the school system’s attorney from the Knox County
Law Director’s Office said that the system would likely settle the claims for reimbursement,
and, with Dr. Laurence’s involvement, would develop an appropriate IEP for Chris for the
next school year. He emphasized that the school system would litigate the Juvenile Court
petition before the ALJ in the due process hearing.38

Because of the short time frame, there was little discovery prior to the due process
hearing.39 Chris’ lengthy school records were obtained. The school system requested
documents from Dr. Laurence, but he only had maintained spare treatment notes. As required
by administrative rule, the names of potential witnesses were exchanged five days before the
hearing. Mike L. and Dr. Laurence were listed for the family. The school system listed the
names of the Principal and several administrators of the special education program.

The underlying theory of the case was unambiguous. The school should be held
accountable for its neglect of Chris’ academic and behavioral needs. The episode in the
bathroom was fueled by this neglect. The filing of the Juvenile Court petition served no

37

The IDEA now requires a manifestation determination if a student with a disability has been determined to
have committed an offense that violates a school rule or the school code of conduct that could result in exclusion
from school for over ten days. The hearing must be held within the first ten days of the removal. See 20 U.S.C.
§1415(k)(1)(E) (2006). This provision serves as another check on the discretion of school officials to exclude
students with disabilities from their current educational program for disability-related conduct. See Shawna L.
Parks & Maronel Barajas, School Discipline and Special Education, 41 CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 337 (2007).
38
After filing the request for a due process hearing, Mike L. requested that the Juvenile Court hearing, which
was scheduled for July 8th, be postponed. The case was continued indefinitely.
39
Tennessee is an open discovery state.
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educational purpose and conflicted with settled case law in Tennessee.40 The school system,
accordingly, should be ordered to withdraw its petition.

The due process hearing was conducted on June 28, 1993. The only issue was the
propriety of the Juvenile Court filing. Dr. Laurence was the first witness. As a specialist in
treating people with AD/HD, he testified that he had been seeing Chris in therapy weekly
since March. The main goal of the therapy was to “stabilize and contain his ADD problem.”41
He observed: “I thought he was beginning to develop some negativistic and oppositional
behaviors as well; very touchy, temperamental, moody, angry, tending to avoid taking
responsibility for himself and assigning blame onto others.”42 He described the chief features
of AD/HD: “Attention Deficit Disorder, with or without hyperactivity, in this case with
hyperactivity, is a disorder characterized by excessive degrees and amounts of behavior,
generally around three dimensions: attention, impulsivity, and hyperactivity. . . . It is generally
these three factors that people look at when they make the diagnosis and then each of these
factors have a variety of symptoms and behavior patterns that are quite common to that.”43

Dr. Laurence testified that Chris never wavered from the contention that he did not
cause the actual damage, instead blaming it on the other boy. He also concluded that the
behavior that formed the basis for the Juvenile Court petition was a manifestation of Chris’

40

See In re Male Special Educ. Student Age 14 (Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Oct. 9, 1987) and In Re McCann, No.
158, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
41
Due Process Hearing Transcript at 41.
42
Id. at 42.
43
Id. at 38.
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AD/HD. In forming this opinion, he alluded to Chris’ attention difficulties, his impulsivity, and
his difficulties with self-control (a form of “noncompliance”).44

The cross-examination of Dr. Laurence centered on the problems that the L. family
was experiencing. These problems stemmed from the divorce of Chris’ father and natural
mother. Chris was having difficulties in his relationship with his stepmother. Dr. Laurence was
working with Chris, his father, and stepmother on these issues.

The next witness was Mike L. He dispassionately reviewed Chris’ history of school
difficulties, his frustrations with the treatment that Chris had received at school, and his
efforts to provide support for Chris. He testified that, when he was informed at the meeting
on May 17th that the Juvenile Court petition would not be withdrawn, “I was just, like, in
shock.”45 Mike L.’s cross-examination was unremarkable. Its prime thrust was to shift the
locus of Chris’ problems from his school performance and his AD/HD to the turmoil that
Chris had experienced since his parents’ divorce.

The school system called no witnesses. The Director of Special Education for the
school system was present for the entire hearing, but he did not testify. Although the IDEA
contains a provision that permits the introduction of new evidence if the decision of the ALJ is
appealed to either federal or state court, this authority is left largely to the discretion of the
district court judge.46 The school system argued that the ALJ did not have “jurisdiction” to

44
45
46

Id. at 73.
Id. at 152.
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (i)(2)(C)(ii) (2006).
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hear the Juvenile Court matter and that the IDEA did not grant immunity to students with
disabilities shielding them from prosecution.

On July 28, 1993, the ALJ rendered his opinion. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law began as follows: “The student has a history of behavioral problems and poor grades
which have been addressed by his parent in every manner suggested by school personnel to
include medical examination and diagnosis of ADHD, individual educational services from
Sylvan Learning Center, psychological services, changes in medication prescribed for ADHD,
and numerous meetings with school personnel.”47 Finding that the behavior underlying the
Juvenile Court petition was a manifestation of Chris’s disability, the ALJ held that the filing of
the petition should be considered “the initiation of a change of placement and/or disciplinary
action commensurate with expulsion or suspension for more than ten days.” 48 By not timely
certifying Chris for special education and not conducting a manifestation hearing prior to the
filing of the petition, the school violated its obligations under the IDEA. The school was
ordered to “take all actions necessary to seek dismissal of the Juvenile Court petition filed
against the student.”49

Following the ALJ decision, the school system had sixty days to appeal. Seeking to
enforce immediate implementation of the decision—withdrawal of the Juvenile Court
decision—a state court action was filed under the Tennessee Administrative Procedures Act
(TAPA) seeking to compel the school system to withdraw the Juvenile Court petition. The
TAPA provides that the decision of an ALJ must be complied with in ten days unless a stay is

47

Chris L. v. Knox County School System at 16-17 (Tenn. Dep’t of Educ. July 28, 1993) (No. 93-15) (ALJ
due process hearing final order).
48
Id. at 19.
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granted. This proactive maneuver, if successful, would have mooted the only issue in the case,
which was yet to be appealed.

D.

A Federal Case

During the time that the TAPA case was awaiting an expedited hearing in state court,
the system filed its appeal of the ALJ’s decision in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee, which is vested with jurisdiction over IDEA appeals. This
stayed the enforcement of the ALJ order. During the fall of 1993, Chris started ninth grade at
his zoned high school with an IEP that specified several behavioral goals and the methods to
reach them. The pretrial process culminated with an agreement that each party could submit
limited additional evidence through depositions, affidavits, or exhibits. The Court would then
hear oral arguments and decide the case. But other developments punctuated the routine
course of this litigation.

While the case was pending, Chris was caught in school with a small amount of
marijuana. In pleadings to the District Court, the Knox County Schools asserted that they did
not know how to proceed with this incident and wanted guidance. Mike L. believed that the
episode warranted a review of Chris’ IEP, not disciplinary punishment. In pleadings, it was
argued that this was a new matter unripe to incorporate into the existing case, and that, in any
event, the school system was seeking an improper advisory opinion. The Court ultimately
agreed, and the matter was dropped from the litigation. Chris was “punished” by his parents,
and continued uninterrupted in school.

49

Id. at 20.
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At the hearing on February 4, 1994, the school system’s local attorney pleaded with
the Court that it was hamstrung by the ALJ’s decision in dealing with special education
students who committed acts of delinquency, as Chris L. allegedly had done.50 They alluded
to hypothetical special education students who committed murder, rape, sexual molestation,
aggravated assault, or weapons offenses, arguing that the school system could not find
appropriate placements for students who were violent.51 In response to this “parade of
horribles,” as it was characterized by Chris’s lawyers, it was emphasized that the Supreme
Court had confronted the same issue in Honig v. Doe, and had identified educational methods
and legal avenues under the IDEA for school systems to pursue. In response to an argument
by the school system that parents at an M-team would never agree to the filing of a juvenile
court petition, the Judge responded, “Write your congressman.”52 The Judge was also
unmoved by the brief testimony by the Director of Special Education that, because
approximately 20% of the students in the Knox County Schools, about 18,000, were IDEA
certified, the ALJ’s decision would wreak havoc with school discipline.53

The decision came down seven months later. On September 29, 1994, the District
Judge ruled four-square in favor of Chris. Adopting the facts essentially as they were
presented them to the ALJ by the family, the Court first relied on a Tennessee IDEA due
process opinion that ordered a school system “to do everything it can” to dismiss a juvenile

50

The distinction between delinquent and unruly acts is an elusive one. Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1102(a) (delinquent acts), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b) (unruly acts). See infra p. 53 and note 154.
51
Oral Arguments at 22, Morgan v. Chris L., 927 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. Tenn. 1994) (No. 3-93-524).
52
Id. at 24.
53
The District Judge also rejected the import of the proffered affidavits of the Juvenile Judge and Chief
Probation Officer. The district judge stated: “I don’t need Judge Garrett, I don’t need a probation officer. You
know, I’ve been a lawyer for more than thirty years, and I’ve been a judge for more than thirteen years, so I have
some idea of what goes on in juvenile court and I’ve practiced in juvenile court. . . . I don’t know anything the judge
or probation officer can tell me about juvenile court since they have nothing to do with this particular case.” Id. at
25.

22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1478529

court petition.54 Next, the Court adopted the rationale of In re McCann,55a four-year-old case
decided by the Tennessee Court of Appeals. In McCann, a rural school district filed a juvenile
court petition against Tony McCann, a boy with mental and emotional disabilities who was
physically and verbally abusive to teachers and who was involved in fighting and other
disruptive behavior.56 No M-team meeting was held to determine whether the behavior was a
manifestation of Tony’s disabilities. After the petition was filed, the juvenile judge ordered
Tony’s mother to keep him out of school pending a court-ordered evaluation. Eventually,
Tony was placed in the temporary custody of the State because of his mother’s inability to
curb his behaviors at home. The Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the school system
violated the IDEA and cognate Tennessee regulations in their response to Tony’s disciplinary
problems. It held: “The school system must follow mandated administrative procedures before
turning the handicapped student over to the juvenile court system.”

Next, the district court discussed the arguments of the school system. It initially
rejected the argument that, by divesting the juvenile court of jurisdiction, the Tennessee
Department of Education wielded the power of a “super-legislature.” The court’s simple
response was that the ALJ’s order did not direct the Juvenile Court to do a thing; the remedy
was directed at the Knox County Schools, proper parties in an IDEA proceeding. It also
deferred to the ALJ’s findings that Chris’ behavior was a manifestation of his AD/HD
condition. Based on this finding, the court disposed of the school’s argument that, from a
therapeutic standpoint, Chris would have been better off facing the ordinary consequences of

54

In re Male Special Educ. Student Age 14 at 12 (Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Oct. 9, 1987) (memorandum decision)
(ALJ ordered school system “to do everything it can” to have petition filed in juvenile court dismissed).
55
No. 158, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). The decision was written by an appeals
court judge who was soon elevated to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Tony McCann was represented by a legal
services lawyer who was part of our informal practice group.
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his alleged actions in the juvenile court. Finally, the court relied on the testimony of Dr.
Laurence and the deposition testimony of a psychiatrist who evaluated Chris at the school
system’s request to counter the school’s contention that Chris was misdiagnosed with AD/HD
instead of Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD), which would not have qualified Chris for
IDEA eligibility.57

E.

Appeal

The school system appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit,58 An Atlanta law firm supplanted the Knox County Law Director as lead
counsel. Lawyers from around the country saw the decision as a vehicle for confronting
school systems who increasingly were using juvenile courts to banish problem children with
disabilities from the schools.59 Because of the nationwide scope of the issues, amicus
assistance was sought from the Center for Law and Education and the Protection and
Advocacy organizations in the Sixth Circuit. The Knox County Schools began a campaign to
convince other school systems to support its positions in the appeal.60 There was an attempt

56
57

This was deemed an “unruly” petition.
ODD is a potential qualifying disorder under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 29 U.S.C. § 794

(2006).
58

While the appeal was pending, another round of litigation commenced over our clients’ entitlement as
prevailing parties to statutory attorney’s fees under 20 U.S.C § 1415(j) (2006). FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d) was relatively
new at the time, and the plaintiffs were one day late in meeting the Rule’s fourteen-day limitation on filing a petition
for fees. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition for fees as untimely. If the rule had specified ten days to file
fee petitions, the petition would have been timely, given intervening weekends and holidays. It took approximately
six months and the authority of a recent Supreme Court decision, but the District Court ultimately ruled that the
delay was excusable neglect that did not have any adverse impact on the school system. The District Court
proceeded to award substantially all of the fees requested.
59
Amicus briefs for Chris L. were filed by the Center For Law and Education, the Michigan Protection and
Advocacy Service, and Ohio Legal Rights Service (on file with author).
60
Amicus briefs for the Knox County Schools were filed by Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County
School System and the national School Boards Association (on file with author).
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in several settlement conferences with a Sixth Circuit mediator to bridge the principled
differences, but no compromise was reached.

Briefing proceeded. The school system made the same technical arguments it did in
the district court. It argued that the filing of the petition did not constitute a change of
placement under IDEA, and therefore no procedural protections were necessary before filing.
It also elaborated the far-reaching, adverse consequences it believed flowed from the district
court’s decision. To illustrate, the brief posed what it termed a hypothetical:
If a disabled student rapes a teacher at school, under the ruling of the district court,
prior to reporting such conduct to juvenile authorities, written notice must be provided
that an M-team meeting will be held and the parents are invited to attend. At the Mteam meeting, the M-team could decide that the rape was not a manifestation of the
student’s disability, and only then could it decide that the juvenile authorities should be
alerted. However, pursuant to the ruling of the district court, if the parents object to the
M-Team’s decision regarding manifestation, the parents can, at that point, initiate a due
process hearing and the disabled student will remain in the current educational
placement during the pendency of the due process proceedings.61

This meant, the school system said, that neither the school system nor the teacher could file
charges with the juvenile court until the due process proceedings and court review are
completed.

For the first time, the school system raised constitutional objections to the ruling of
the ALJ and the District Court. The first was premised on Article I, Section 8, the Spending
Clause, and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman.62 The school system argued
that the decision below imposed an intrusive obligation—barring the filing of a petition—that

61

Brief of Appellants at 31, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (on file with author).
Id. at 35-37. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Congress exceeded its
authority under the Spending Power to require Pennsylvania to fund the “bill of rights” provision of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010(1), (2) (2006)). The appellants
conceded that all circuits had held that the IDEA was also enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth

62
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was beyond the scope of Congressional power, even if Congress had intended such a result.
The second constitutional argument was bottomed on the Tenth Amendment and Gregory v.
Ashcroft.63 It asserted that the district court’s prohibition on filing criminal petitions intruded
on the “traditional state function of protecting its citizens from the perpetration of crimes by
juveniles and of providing needed rehabilitation services to them.”64 These constitutional
arguments, which were rooted in the new federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court,
sought to immunize school systems from the reach of the federal mandates of the IDEA. If the
IDEA was not premised on the power of Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment, as was
argued by the school system, but only bottomed on the Spending Clause, then a federal court
ruling that dictated to a school system that it must refrain from prosecuting a student with
disabilities—a power not expressly included in the IDEA—was beyond the realm of
Congressional power.

The National School Boards Association (NSBA) and the Metropolitan Nashville and
Davidson County School System filed amicus briefs. Both cited a rising tide of school
violence and the role that juvenile courts play in combating crimes in school. They also
emphasized the responsibilities of school systems to promote school safety and protect the
majority of students. Each claimed that the district court decision would prohibit schools from
calling the police or would require the police to make on-the-spot determinations about a

Amendment.
63
Brief of Appellants at 38-40. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (Congress did not intend to
include state judges under the protections of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§
621-624 (2006), because there is no plain statement of such intention in the statute).
64
Brief of Appellants at 40.
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student’s disability. Chris’ bathroom incident was transformed into a scenario where a
“student brings an Uzi to school and starts shooting people.”65

The Appellees’ brief highlighted the limited nature of the district court’s decision and
its grounding in the language, purpose, and history of the IDEA and state law. It conceded
that school systems could call the police, mental health crisis units, or any other resource to
aid in responding to students who exhibit disruptive or dangerous behaviors. It could not be
argued that schools were prohibited from calling the police in cases of serious violence. It was
the myriad of cases like Chris’ that troubled special education lawyers and advocates across
the country.
The issues raised several pivotal questions. What constituted a “crime” in the context
of misbehavior at school? Could the distinction between “unruly” behavior and “delinquent”
behavior stand up to close scrutiny? Shouldn’t the institution best equipped to devise
corrective plans for students who act out in school, not an entity like the juvenile court whose
resources are scarce and whose expertise with children with disabilities is sorely lacking, be
the entity of first choice for dealing with misconduct? The brief also concisely responded to
the new constitutional arguments of the school system, figuring that the Sixth Circuit would
not be interested in hearing these claims for the first time on appeal in a case that rested
predominantly on statutory grounds.

The amici for the Appellees, The Center for Law and Education, The Juvenile Law
Center of Philadelphia, the Michigan and Ohio protection and advocacy programs, and
Children and Adults with Attention Deficit Disorders (CHADD), broadened the context of the
65

Brief of Amicus Curiae Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, Morgan v. Chris L.,
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case. They presented studies demonstrating the over-representation of children with
disabilities in the juvenile court system and identifying as a chief cause of this phenomenon the
paucity of community-based services for children with mental and emotional disabilities,
including school system programs. These briefs also pointed out the inextricable connection
between a student’s learning and behavior and the many options that are available to schools,
working in conjunction with other agencies with behavioral expertise, to address these
problems through a comprehensive approach. The briefs admonished that the decision below
was a bulwark counseling against the practice of transforming educational disputes into
criminal ones.

The case was argued on April 16, 1996, before Judges Richard Surheinrich
(Michigan), Judge Guy R. Cole (Ohio), and Judge Leroy J. Contie (Ohio). In the Sixth Circuit
at this time counsel did not learn the composition of the panel until the morning of the
argument. Having researched all IDEA decisions in the Circuit, we were able quickly to
determine that none of the judges on the panel had written an IDEA decision in the past.
Judge Surheinrich was a President George Bush appointee; Judge Cole had been recently
appointed by President Clinton; Judge Contie, a senior judge, was appointed by President
Reagan.

The Atlanta counsel for the Knox County Schools began by emphasizing that the issue
on appeal was a “pure issue of law as to whether the district court erred in adopting a per se
rule that in every instance in which a school official files a petition with juvenile court that that

106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (on file with author).
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constitutes a change in placement under IDEA that must go through the Act’s procedures.”66
Almost immediately, Judge Surheinrich asked:
JS:

Counsel, would that mean that any time a crime is committed it must be
reported to the juvenileY

CW:

No sir, not every crime.

JS:

If it’s a per se rule why wouldn’t it? Why wouldn’t you have as a citizen the
obligation if it’s a per se rule to report every crime to the authorities?

* * *
CW:

Your honor, the answer to that is no. There are some crimes that by federal
and state law must be reported but not all crimes are required to be reported.

The judges pressed him on the criteria that the school system used in deciding whether or not
to file a juvenile petition and whether the school system had a policy that embodied these
criteria. The school system attorney had to concede that there were neither criteria nor a
policy. The judges seemed sympathetic to Chris’s problem. Judge Contie noted that “here we
have a problem medically, and you are trying to separate out the manifestation of the crime or
the act here. . . . But the manifestation of the act resulting from his disability is intertwined
with his problem, and you can’t guarantee that he isn’t going to be sent to a juvenile home for
twenty days.”67 Toward the end of the appellant’s argument, Judge Cole summarized his view
of the school system’s constitutional and statutory claims:
I have some difficulty, personally, accepting your premise, accepting your argument
that there is an infringement here on sovereign rights that are historically and
traditionally left to the states. It seems to me as I boil down some of the essence of the
case, and I know you see this differently, that we’ve got a situation where the school
system arguably ignored federal law and failed to attend to the educational needs of a
child for an entire school year. And that this discipline problem escalated because of the
failure of the school system to follow federal law and guidelines in terms of putting
together a program for this kid, and this escalated into maybe a more serious discipline
problem, and now the school system seeks to discipline him through the criminal
system as opposed to through a structured program. I mean I can envision all kinds of
scenarios where a kid scratches a desk or something of this nature, which might be
construed as defacing school property, and the school system has ignored this kid’s
66

Oral Arguments at 2, Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (on file with author). [hereinafter
Sixth Circuit Oral Arguments].
67
Id. at 4.
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problems. . . . I guess maybe we’re looking at this through different prisms, but it seems
to me that the school system is seeking to punish a child for the school system’s
ineptitude.68

It was not a feat to grasp immediately that at least Judge Cole and probably Judge
Contie saw the case through a child-centered “prism.” It had been decided during preparation
for the oral argument that, if pressed, the appellee would take the position that the school
system could and should report dangerous actions to the police.69 Judge Surheinrich’s
questions about when “reporting” of crimes should take place, therefore, were not
unexpected. This issue was a palpably sensitive one at the heart of the case.

Right off the bat, Judge Surheinrich asked: “Are you agreeing that there should not be
a per se rule then that says that reporting a crime is a change of position?”70 This was a key
moment. Should I insist that every act of misconduct, however severe, be treated the same, or
should I concede that the facts of this case, as found by the ALJ and district court, warranted
the finding of a potential change of placement here?71 I responded as follows: “The answer
your Honor is we don’t read a per se rule into the district court’s decision. The nature of
IDEA litigation is individualized.”72 This seemed to satisfy Judge Surheinrich, and the
remaining questions from Judge Contie sought to clarify the IDEA manifestation process and
the relationship of this process to juvenile court proceedings.

68

Id. at 5.
A Tennessee statute vests exclusively in the principal the authority to report serious crimes to law
enforcement. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4301(a) (2007).
70
Sixth Circuit Oral Argument at 7.
71
The latter point could not be pressed too vigorously. Even though Judge Contie envisioned Chris
potentially spending twenty days in juvenile detention, this was an unlikely result even from the most punitive
juvenile judge.
72
Sixth Circuit Oral Arguments at 7.
69
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The case remained under submission for nine months. We continued to consult by
telephone with disability rights attorneys and public defenders from across the country who
were using the district court decision either in IDEA proceedings or in juvenile court. On
January 21, 1997, the panel, in a per curiam decision, which was not recommended for
publication, affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The opinion tracked the child-focused, disability-driven, school-failure emphasis that
had been pursued from the beginning of the case. It posed the issue on appeal as “whether on
May 12, 1993, by filing a juvenile court petition for the alleged destruction of property, the
Knox County School System was in violation of IDEA procedural requirements insuring [sic]
Chris’ rights.”73 It next discussed the relevant provisions of the IDEA—AD/HD eligibility,
discipline, change of placement—and the leading cases interpreting these sections, stressing
the importance of the procedural safeguards “as a means of curbing the unilateral ability of
schools to punish a disabled student for behavior that is a manifestation of the student’s
disabilities. Accordingly, the decisions of the ALJ and the district court simply require that
schools contemplating juvenile petitions do what the IDEA requires of them.”74

Echoing the sentiments that Judge Cole had expressed in oral argument, the opinion
continued with several propositions that were raised but not pressed. The first was the
recognition that, when schools fail to comply with the strictures of the IDEA, children with
disabilities can be causally harmed: “When school systems fail to accommodate a disabled
student’s behavioral problems, these problems may be attributed to the school system’s failure

73
74

Morgan v. Chris L., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (on file with author).
Id. at *14.
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to comply with the requirements of the IDEA.”75 Next, the opinion acknowledged the
phenomenon of disciplinary exclusion, including the specter of bad faith by the school system:
“Indeed, rather than affording Chris the procedural safeguards mandated by the IDEA, the
Knox County Schools sought to exclude him through a punitive and disciplinary measure in
juvenile court.”76 Finally, the decision recognized the invalidity of the school’s position that
they were merely seeking more effective services for Chris: “By resorting to juvenile court,
the school system is, at a minimum, proposing that the juvenile court develop its own
program of rehabilitative services for Chris.77 Pursuant to the IDEA’s procedural safeguards,
the school system must adopt its own plan and institute an M-team meeting before initiating a
juvenile court petition for this purpose.”78

F.

Talking Out of School

The local press coverage of the decision was critical of the decision and its supposed
implications.79 One was headlined “Court Ruling Hurting Schools.”80 It stated that a school
bus driver had informed the Superintendent that students on his bus, who had read about the
decision in the paper that morning, said “Well, gee, we can do anything we want to now.
Because I’m [hyperactive] I can do whatever I want and get by with it. I can kick the wall or
whatever.”81

75

Id. at *14-15.
Id. at *15.
77
Id. at *16.
78
Id. The decision cited a Tennessee juvenile court statute requiring that a petition for delinquent or unruly
conduct must allege “that the child is in need of treatment or rehabilitation.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-120(1).
79
David Keim, Knox Loses Special Education Case: County Ignored Federal Rules in Charging Unruly
Disabled Student-Appeals Court, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 23, 1997, at A1.
80
David Keim, Court Ruling Hurting Schools: Officials Say Decision Limits Discipline of Special-Ed
Students, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 25, 1997, at A1.
81
Id.
76
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Another story followed, “Does Disability Place Pupil Beyond Law? Knox Case May
Go to Supreme Court.”82 It quoted Chris’ version of what had transpired. As he consistently
had done, he pointed the finger at the other boy and recounted how, when he went to the
office to report the incident, he was told that he was suspended when the principal saw that
his socks were wet. Mike L. was quoted as saying that, although he believed that Chris should
have suffered consequences for being in an unauthorized bathroom, the juvenile charges were
too severe. He was worried that a juvenile record might hinder Chris’ chances of getting a
job. Chris confessed that he sometimes used his disability to his advantage when he didn’t
want to do school work, but stated that he now was more mature and wanted to help his
natural mother pay her bills. The article concluded with this quote from Chris: “[T]he school
system wanted to use me as an example and they’ve just pushed it too far.”83

G.

Certiorari

“Our legal counsel messed up,” a spokesperson for the Knox County Schools said
when the system’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was dismissed as untimely by
one day.84 But the decision to file for certiorari had already been announced; the school
system evidently had decided to go for broke. It hired Carter Phillips of Sidley & Austin in
Washington D.C. to write the certiorari petition. Phillips was a highly regarded Supreme
Court practitioner. His retainer agreement with the school system called for a cap on payment

82

David Keim, Does Disability Place Pupil Beyond Law? Knox Case May Go to Supreme Court,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 1997, at A1.
83
Id.
84
David Keim, Special-Ed Appeal Lost Because of Missed Deadline: County Plans to Go to Supreme
Court, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 1997, at A1.
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of $25,000 plus expenses for preparing the petition, “lobbying the Solicitor General,” and
working with amici.85

Alan Morrison of the Public Citizens Litigation Group, an experienced and talented
Supreme Court advocate, agreed to steer the respondents through the certiorari process, pro
bono. There is much arcana surrounding Supreme Court practice, and a seasoned hand was an
invaluable resource, as will be seen. The amici in the Sixth Circuit agreed to join in opposing
certiorari.

The school system’s cert. petition was filed on April 21, 1997. Its tone was alarmist:
The decision of the Sixth Circuit has sent shockwaves throughout both the educational
community and the state juvenile justice systems. School officials, who are legitimately
concerned with the safety and security of students and school property, must now
consider whether a student who engaged in illegal conduct may have a disability and
whether the procedures of the IDEA must therefore be satisfied before seeking the
intervention of juvenile justice authorities.86

The petition cited statistics on school violence and discussed how schools were having
tremendous difficulties responding to the problem of delinquency. Citing federalism concerns,
the petition argued that the lack of clear authority in the IDEA could not justify the
appropriation of core state functions such as school discipline and juvenile justice. The
petition claimed that the Sixth Circuit decision constituted a “breathtaking” arrogation of state
power and an affront to federalism and that the expansive reading of the IDEA’s stay-put
provision was in conflict with Congress’ intentions and with Honig v. Doe. The petition
exclaimed: “The notion that a school official dealing with delinquent behavior should consider
85

Letter from Carter G. Phillips, Sidley & Austin, to Richard Beeler, Knox County Law Director (Apr. 1,
1997) (on file with author). The retainer agreement was obtained through a statutory open records request to the
Knox County Law Department.
86
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681).
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first the commands of the IDEA before invoking the powers of the juvenile justice system is
nothing short of astonishing.”87

The amici on behalf of the Knox County Schools, the National School Boards
Association (NSBA) and the Georgia School Boards Association, were equally harsh in their
assessments of the potential for mischief caused by the Sixth Circuit decision. Although Chris
committed simple vandalism, the NSBA argued, the rationale of the decision would apply
“when a student brings an Uzi to school and starts shooting people.”88 The Sixth Circuit
decision also placed other students at risk. Noting that twenty percent of students with serious
emotional disorders are arrested at least once before they leave school, the NSBA posed the
ultimate hypothetical: “Under the rule established in the decision below, if a student is holding
a teacher or another student at gunpoint or a serious gang fight involving disabled students
breaks out in the school, school officials would be in violation of the IDEA if they called the
police because the student may be ultimately incarcerated.”89 The Georgia School Boards
Association followed suit: “In the calculus of values inherent in the public schools, there
cannot be higher priority than that which should be accorded to the personal safety and
protection of innocent students, and this Court should not sanction a court decision which
seems to give violent, disruptive, disabled children a license to pillage, maim, and even kill,
free from the traditional criminal processes relied on to protect human life and property.”90

87

Id. at 14.
Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat’l Sch. Bds. Ass’n in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
3, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681).
89
Id. at 17-18.
90
Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief on Behalf of Ga. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, Inc., Amicus
Curiae, in Support of Petitioner at 10, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681).
88
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Naturally, the Appellees wanted to avoid Supreme Court review and preserve the
excellent decision below. Following the issuance of the mandate by the Sixth Circuit in late
February, counsel for the family insistently pursued the dismissal of the Juvenile Court
petition. They succeeded in obtaining an official determination from the Juvenile Court that it
had dismissed the petition and destroyed Chris’ records. The memorandum embodying this
determination was written by the Juvenile Court’s chief probation officer. It succinctly
described the Juvenile Court’s handling of this matter:
The petition in question was filed May 12, 1993 and was set for hearing on July 8,
1993. On that date the matter was passed to be rest because other litigation was
pending on this matter in other courts. As that litigation remained active elsewhere the
petition was never reset in this court. When the youth turned 18 on January 3, 1997 our
case was closed. At that time, in keeping with our policy, since no formal disposition
had ever been entered regarding this youth, the record was destroyed and his name has
been removed from the records of this court.91

With the dismissal and Chris turning eighteen, it was argued that the matter was moot.
The rest of the brief in opposition stressed the fact-driven, local nature of the ruling. The
decisions of all three tribunals, it was pointed out, rested on state court cases and state
education rulings. These cases were squarely situated within the remedial purposes of the
IDEA.

Because it was keenly in the interests of the Appellees for the Court to consider the
petition this term, counsel expedited the preparation of the brief in opposition. Alan Morrison
advised counsel of the number of certiorari decision days remaining. There were events
happening in Congress that were worrisome.

91

Memorandum from Larry Gibney, Knox County Juvenile Court Chief Probation Officer, to Steve Griffin,
Knox County Schools Chief of Security (March 12, 1997), cited in Respondent’s Brief in Opposition at Appendix
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H.

The 1997 Reauthorization of the IDEA

Throughout the litigation, Congress was working on the reauthorization of the IDEA.
It looked as if a bill acceptable to all interests would be enacted in the fall of 1996. Key issues
surrounding cessation of educational services for students with disabilities who are expelled
for misbehavior, other disciplinary provisions, assistive technology, and procedural
protections were close to being resolved. Interest in the bill peaked when it was learned from
lawyers with the Center for Law and Education that there was a concerted effort by the
NSBA to “overrule” Chris L. in the reauthorized bill. The Atlanta counsel for the Knox
County Schools was an active participant in the NSBA’s legal affairs. The school system itself
was organizing protests from other Tennessee school systems to Tennessee Senator Bill Frist,
a physician who was a key player in the reauthorization.

In the negotiations over the reauthorization, the Chris L. case was being portrayed by
the school system negotiators factually just as it was painted in the briefs and certiorari
petition of the school system and its allies. An outlier court had immunized students with
disabilities from prosecution, so the tale went, no matter how severe their crimes. The image
propagated was one of Chris looking like Sylvester Stallone carrying an Uzi and running
amok in school. Columbine still had not occurred, but the fear of such a debacle was
exploited.92 This was the IDEA out of control, it was claimed. Surely Congress could never
have intended this startling result.

B, Morgan v. Chris L., 520 U.S. 1271 (1997) (No. 96-1681).
92
In February of 1997 a well-publicized school shooting occurred in Bethel, Alaska. There were other
reported school shootings in October and December of that year. DAVID CULLEN, COLUMBINE 14 (2009).
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The lawyers and advocates from the disability community worked hard to counter this
image. They urged Congressional staff members to read the decision and judge for themselves
whether the predicted “parade of horribles” could be pinned on the Chris L. litigation.
Compromise language was drafted that became part of the IDEA.93 This section is entitled
“Referral to and Action By Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities” and states in relevant
part:
Nothing in this part shall be construed to prohibit an agency from reporting a crime by
a child with a disability to appropriate authorities or to prevent State law enforcement
and judicial authorities from exercising their responsibilities with regard to the
application of Federal and State law to crimes committed by a child with a disability.94

The disability advocates argued that, because Chris L. did not prohibit “referrals,” this
section was unnecessary and would constitute an open invitation for school systems to
prosecute students with disabilities in juvenile court. The language remained in the bill,
however, in part because of the heavy pressure from the NSBA and the tacit approval of
Senator Frist. Furthermore, representatives of the United States Department of Education
viewed the provision as reasonably innocuous.95 They believed that the section merely
codified the holding in Chris L., which they concluded did not prohibit referrals to law
enforcement personnel.96

The reauthorization process began again in earnest in January of 1997, almost
simultaneously with the Sixth Circuit decision. A consensus-based process of mediation led by

93

20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(9)(A) (2006).
Id.
95
Telephone Interview with Thomas Hehir, Former Director of Office of Special Education Programs, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ. (OSEP) (Oct. 30, 2002).
96
A leading special education publication portrayed the 1997 Amendment as “effectively” overruling Chris
L.. Perry A. Zirkel, Prosecuting Disabled Students: IDEA ‘97 Effectively Negates Chris L., 14 THE SPECIAL
EDUCATOR 6 (1999).
94
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a key staff member of Senator Trent Lott went forward.97 When the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court, any hope of excluding the new language was lost. The best the disability
community could do was to prevent any amendments to the new provision that would make it
easier for schools to refer special education students to juvenile court and to contain any
harmful language in the legislative history. They succeed on both fronts. The only legislative
history on this section is a statement by Senator Harkin, one of the legislation’s co-sponsors,
that “[t]he bill also authorizes proper referrals to police and appropriate authorities when
disabled children commit crimes, so long as the referrals do not circumvent the school’s
responsibilities under IDEA.”98 A compromise bill was achieved. President Clinton signed the
legislation on June 4, 1997.

After consultation with the Court’s Chief Deputy Clerk, counsel for the Respondents
faxed a letter to the Supreme Court, with a copy to counsel for the Knox County Schools. It
alerted the Court to this new provision in the IDEA but stated that it should have no
discernible effect on this case. The next announcement day was scheduled for June 9, 1997.
On that day, certiorari was denied. In consultation with the family, counsel issued a press
release stating in part:
After 4 years, 4 successful court decisions, including an appeal to the U.S Supreme
Court, and the expenditure of hundreds of thousands of dollars by the Knox County
Schools, this case has concluded successfully for Chris and his family. We hope that
school system administrators have learned a lesson about identifying and educating
children with behavioral disabilities. Cases like this wouldn’t arise if school
administrators pursued a policy of helping disabled students and their parents–as the
law intends–not fighting them in court.”99

97

The staff member had a child with a serious physical and mental disability.
143 CONG. REC. S4403 (1997).
99
Counsel For Chris L., Press Release, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Knox County Schools’ Appeal in Chris
L. Case (June 9, 1997) (on file with author).
98
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The school system defended its pursuit of the case. The Superintendent said that by
“continuing on the path we chose,” people focused on the issue and understood “the absurdity
of what schools are dealing with.”100 He called “asinine” the courts’ interpretation that “a
special-needs student could commit a crime in a classroom and escape charges because of his
or her condition.”101

I.

The Aftermath

The following letters to the editor encapsulate the conflicting currents in the Chris L. case:
September 24, 1993
Editor, The News-Sentinel
I was appalled to read in The News Sentinel of an eighth-grader who kicked loose a
water pipe in a bathroom at Northwest Middle School—causing $800 in damages—
whose parents asked that his juvenile petition be dismissed because he has attention
deficit disorder. As a parent of a seventh-grader who has been treated for ADD and
who still has a harder time with school work than his classmates of equal intelligence, I
know that living with and working with ADD children is not an easy task. But ADD
kids are not stupid. In fact, most are excellent manipulators. The hardest part of living
with an ADD child is staying in control while working with a kid who knows exactly
how to push you to the edge. Still, at some point in their lives, all these ADD children
have to live in the real world—where actions bring consequences. To allow a child to
perform an act of vandalism and then excuse him by claiming, “He can’t help it—he’s
ADD,” is not doing the child or society any good. . . . I’m glad his problem has a name
and that ADD is recognized as a definite learning disability. Knowing what he has, how
it affects him and how to control it have done wonders for our son’s self-esteem. But as
we have struggled with ADD in our own family, we have watched it become more and
more of a catch-all to explain away everything from kids who can’t read to kids who
pull guns on the teacher. . . . A kid who causes $800 worth of damage to school
property ought to be personally paying back the $800 to the school principal—$2 or $5
or $10 at a time—for as long as it takes to settle his debt.
Jane Schuler
Knoxville102

100

Randy Kenner, Knox Appeal of Special-Ed Case Rejected: U.S. Supreme Court Turns Down Petition,
KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 10, 1997, at A1.
101
Id. With the cooperation of the lawyer with whom we had been dealing in the Law Director’s office, we
rapidly settled on a fully compensatory amount of attorneys’ fees. The school system paid approximately five times
this amount to the Atlanta Law Firm and to Sidley & Austin.
102
Jane Schuler, Letter to the Editor, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Sept. 24, 1993.
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October 15, 1993
Editor, The News-Sentinel
Jane Schuler’s letterYregarding the child with ADD (attention deficit disorder), who is
being prosecuted in juvenile court for damaging school property, needs a reply. I found
myself wondering what news story she had read, since she evidently read a different
story from the one I read. Her statement that the child should be made to pay back the
damages was interesting, to say the least. This is exactly what the parents of the child in
question offered to the school system. The school system refused to accept this, wishing
instead to further stigmatize and traumatize an already disturbed child by throwing him
into the Juvenile Court system, to be arrested, handcuffed, strip-searched and locked up
in a cage. They apparently feel this will help this child a lot more than working with the
parents and mental health professionals to come up with a placement and services that
would help this child overcome this type of destructive behavior. . . . No one that I
know of is advocating that we tolerate such behavior as what occurred at Northwest
Middle School. What we should be doing is trying to help these children by coming up
with the psychological, medical and educational services they need to overcome this
handicap, not putting them in jail. Just as you wouldn’t jail an epileptic child for having
a seizure, you certainly shouldn’t treat an ADD or ADHD child any more harshly for
displaying his or her handicap. One last thought for Ms. Schuler. I suggest that you
push Knox County Schools to start obeying these state and federal laws regarding
special education. . . . That means it is Knox County officials who are the lawbreakers,
not the ADD child.
Michael Lawson
Knoxville103

Public defenders, special education lawyers, and child advocates recognized the
deleterious consequences surrounding the issue of over-criminalization.104 With the shootings
at Columbine in 1999 and other highly publicized episodes of school violence,105 the open
invitation to school systems contained in the 1997 Amendments spurred increased use of the
juvenile courts to handle in-school misconduct by students with disabilities.106 Although

103

Michael Lawson, Letter to the Editor, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Oct. 15, 1993.
Students with disabilities are overrepresented in the juvenile court system. Approximately two-thirds of
the nation’s juvenile inmates have at least one mental illness. See Solomon Moore, Mentally Ill Offenders strain
Juvenile System, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 2009, at A1. See Dean Hill Rivkin & Brenda McGee, Disability Advocacy
in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, in TENNESSEE ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR JUVENILE DEFENSE (1997).
105
DAVID CULLEN, COLUMBINE (2009).
106
Research on rates of exclusion from school show that students with disabilities are disproportionately
excluded, despite the strictures of the 1997 IDEA Amendments. See Russell J. Skiba, Special Education and
School Discipline: A Precarious Balance, 27 BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 81, 89 (2002).
104
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statistics do not exist to gauge the exact extent of this practice,107 knowledgeable lawyers
believe that the practice is national in scope.108 A recent study by the American Bar
Association’s Juvenile Justice Center on the state of juvenile courts in Virginia found that the
juvenile justice system “was being loaded down with inappropriate referrals, particularly
mental health and school-related cases.109 Although IDEA decisions emerged soon after the
Chris L. decision that acknowledged that impermissible motives often prompted school
systems to file juvenile court petitions,110 in recent years judges have been decidedly hostile to
Chris L.-type claims.111

This trend began within weeks of the 1997 reauthorization. A Wisconsin state
appellate court allowed a juvenile prosecution of a child with a disability to go forward,

107

Statistics on school crime show that in 1996-97, 10% of all public schools reported at least one serious
violent crime to a law enforcement representative. Another 40% of public schools reported a less serious violent or
nonviolent crime. The remaining 43% of public schools did not report any of these crimes to the police. The vast
majority of crimes reported by public schools were of the less serious violent or nonviolent type. In the 1996-97
reporting period, 424,000 total crimes were reported to the police; 402,000 of these were of the less serious nature.
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY 17-19 (2002), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003009.pdf.
108
See Eileen Ordover, When Schools Criminalize Disability: Education Law Strategies for Legal Advocates
iii (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In 1996, the National Council on Disability found
that “schools still try to expel or suspend students who present behavioral or other challenges.” NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, IMPROVING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT:
MAKING SCHOOLS WORK FOR ALL OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN, SUPPLEMENT viii (1996), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/14/86/85. pdf.
109
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 4 (2002), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/
cfjfull.pdf. See also THE ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & THE HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES
SUSPENDED: THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE POLICIES 28
(2000), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/17/
21/dd.pdf.
110
See, e.g., Cabot School District, 29 IDELR 300 (SEA AR Sept. 21, 1998) (“call to the police by agent of
the school was not . . . placed for the purpose of preserving the legitimate safety of the students and the faculty, but
was made for . . . purposes of avoiding compliance with the child’s behavior management plan . . . and of causing a
change of placement.”).
111
See, e.g., Joseph M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., No. 99-4645, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2994, at *16-17
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that section 1415(k)(9)(A) overruled Chris L. determination that filing of juvenile petition
constituted change of placement); Commonwealth v. Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (student
with disabilities prosecuted for possession of small amount of marijuana in school and found not entitled to IDEA
procedural protections); State v. Trent N., 569 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (IDEA procedures need not be
exhausted before State can file delinquency petition for disabled student who was on juvenile court probation).
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distinguishing Chris L. on state law grounds because the case had been initiated by the district
attorney (as required by Wisconsin law) instead of by school officials.112 The student, who
was diagnosed as emotionally disturbed at age three, was partially enrolled in classes for
students with emotional disabilities. He was prosecuted for three incidents: in one, he
allegedly hit another student; in another, he allegedly lit a match and threw it into a school
locker; in a final incident he was accused of disorderly conduct. His parents were contesting
the adequacy of his school program under the Due Process procedures of the IDEA. The
court reasoned that the Chris L. remedy–withdrawal of the juvenile petition–was unavailable
as against the district attorney.113 Several years later, a pair of cases explicitly held,
unfortunately with little serious analysis, that the 1997 Amendments had “effectively
overruled” Chris L.114

Several experienced education advocates have creatively analyzed the room ostensibly
left open in the Chris L. provision in the 1997 amendments to the IDEA.115 Open areas
include: What is “reporting”? What is a “crime”? Who are “appropriate authorities”? These
advocates have also charted inventive pathways for challenges to referrals to law enforcement
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. Others have shown advocates how
to use the IDEA for better educational outcomes once a student is enmeshed in juvenile court

112

Trent N., 569 N.W.2d 719. Accord Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d 883.
Trent N., 569 N.W.2d 719.
114
Joseph M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 2001 WL 283154 (E.D.Pa. 2001); Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d
883. In Joseph M., the student was emotionally disturbed. His IEP recommended that he receive a “full-time
emotional support placement” outside of the school district. The district took disciplinary actions against Joseph
M. on at least seven occasions, including filing reports with the police department. He ultimately set a small fire in
the school cafeteria. This episode led to his incarceration. Nathaniel N. went even further than Joseph M.,
reckoning that Congress had implicitly rejected the reasoning in Chris L., and that a referral to juvenile court could
not constitute a change in placement. In Nathaniel N., the student had a long history of allegedly disruptive
behavior. He was the subject of numerous disciplinary actions, including directing vulgar language at teachers,
disobeying school rules, and failing to report for assigned detentions. A psycho-educational evaluation concluded
that Nathaniel’s behavior potentially warranted placement in a program for students with behavioral and emotional
113
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proceedings.116 The rising awareness of these issues should lead to new rules-based
challenges.117 The climate for revisiting Chris L.-type legal claims is ripe: what is needed is an
encompassing theory that returns the issue to the remedial roots of the IDEA and the
restoration of reasonable discretion on the part of school administrators to fashion
nonpunitive consequences for school-based misbehavior for all students.

Given the history of the litigation of this issue, future challenges will face an uphill—
but not insurmountable—battle. Cases like Joseph M. and Nathaniel N.118 and subsequent
opinions by IDEA hearing officers119 have provided the “green light” to schools to refer to
police (and juvenile courts) for less and less serious offenses. One disturbing opinion held
that if school officials subjectively believe that a student’s conduct might be characterized as
“criminal,” they may report to police.120

This trend prompted a task force of the American Psychological Association to
criticize an “increase of referrals to the juvenile justice system for infractions that were once

disturbances. He ultimately was found with two small packets of marijuana while at school and was prosecuted.
115
See, e.g., Ordover, supra note 105, at 18-20.
116
See JOSEPH B. TULMAN & JOYCE A. MCGEE, SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (IDEA): FOR CHILDREN IN THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY SYSTEM (1998).
117
Based on the information provided by a listserv run by the Council for Parents Advocates and Attorneys
(COPAA), an organization for special education lawyers and advocates, there appears to be an upswing in the
number of lawyers in legal services and other public interest programs devoting attention to the problem of
criminalization. See generally http://www.copaa.org.
118
Joseph M., No. 99-4645, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2994, Nathaniel N., 764 N.E.2d 883.
119
E.g., Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist., 108 LRP 40201 (Tex. SEA 2007) (holding that a school can report
“alleged crimes” even if the “rationality [or] effectiveness” of the practice is questionable); Katy Indep. Sch. Dist.,
108 LRP 2915 (Tex. SEA 2007) (holding that a school may pursue criminal prosecutions for acts related to a
child’s disabilities, “even for minor criminal offenses”) (emphasis added). See also Logansport Cmty. Sch. Dist.
and Logansport Area Joint Special Services Cooperative, 107 LRP 35429 (Ind. SEA 2006) (holding that a school
may report a “crime” to police “for purposes of documentation,” even if no damages were caused, and even if the
school did not intend to press charges and no charges were in fact brought).
120
Harwich Pub. Sch., 107 LRP 30521 (Mass. SEA 2007) (holding that school officials were entitled to
report a student’s animated flipbook depicting a plane crash to police, even though the student had done nothing
that could possibly be construed as criminal).
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handled at school”121—an increase disproportionately affecting children with disabilities.122
Cases brought under IDEA are littered with stories of inappropriate referrals. A Kentucky
student was charged with drug trafficking after she was pressured into giving a classmate
some of her prescription Adderall.123 Prior to the incident, she had pleaded with the school
nurse to keep her medication for her so that she would not be exposed to such pressures. A
Minnesota student shoved a classmate and an education assistant and threatened a teacher,
who called the police. Although no damage or injuries resulted, he was charged with fifth
degree assault and disorderly conduct.124 Similarly, school officials were allowed to call the
police to report an Alabama student who made a verbal threat to a teacher and used profanity
in the principal’s office.125 Finally, in an extreme Minnesota case, a student was charged with
disorderly conduct in an apparent act of retaliation against his parents’ complaints that the
school should have provided him with an IEP.126 The basis of the disorderly conduct charge
was tipping off a classmate’s hat and tapping his foot during class—charges that the court
nonchalantly held were supported by “probable cause.”127

121

RUSSELL SKIBA ET AL., AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N ZERO TOLERANCE TASK FORCE, ARE ZERO
TOLERANCE POLICIES EFFECTIVE IN THE SCHOOLS? AN EVIDENTIARY REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9 (2006),
available at http://www.apa.org/ed/cpse/zttfreport.pdf [hereinafter “APA Report”].
122
The report is careful to note that referrals to juvenile courts have increased across the boardCnot just for
students with disabilities. Id. at 76-77. However, students with disabilities are disproportionately represented in
the juvenile justice system, and referrals for relatively minor offenses are undoubtedly contributing to the
overrepresentation. See, supra notes 101-06.
123
S.E. v. Grant County Bd. of Educ., 544 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008) (IDEA claim dismissed on exhaustion
grounds).
124
Shakopee Indep. Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR 171 (Minn. SEA 2005) (holding that the conduct was criminal).
125
Guntersville City B.d. of Educ., 47 IDELR 84 (Al. SEA 2006) (“I’ll kick your ass if you touch me
again.”). The hearing officer held that the school did not commit a violation of IDEA by reporting the conduct even
though the outburst was caused by the school’s failure to properly implement the student’s IEP. Unfortunately, the
police in this situation determined that the student was in violation of his probation and arrested him.
126
S.A.S. v. Hibbing Pub. Sch., 2005 WL 2230415 (D.Minn. 2005). See also B.L. v. Boyertown Area Sch.
Dist., 52 IDELR 42 (E.D. Pa 2009) (IDEA-certified student whose behavioral problems included frequent use of
derogatory and inappropriate remarks arrested by a State Trooper at the behest of his Principal for cursing a
teacher).
127
Id.
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These cases have erased the line between criminal prosecutions and routine discipline.
Courts have seized on the language of (k)(6) to sanitize the behavior of school officials who
report in order to exclude difficult children. At the same time, courts have either ignored or
eviscerated the limitation on school discretion to report—that referrals cannot be used to
“circumvent” a school’s obligations under IDEA.128 The Trent N. court was blindly optimistic
that police and prosecutorial discretion and juvenile court supervision would prevent schools
from referring as an “end run” around the IDEA.129 Thus far, this far-sighted optimism
remains in the minority. There are several dynamics at play that must be confronted for the
issue to be viewed more sympathetically by the courts.

First, police and prosecutorial discretion has not proven to be a significant check on
school referrals. Often, responding police will not know that a child has a disability.130 Even
if they did, they may lack any training or understanding of what that means. It is the school,
not the police, that should address a child’s disability-related behavior.

Second, another factor profoundly influencing the aftermath of Chris L. has been the
explosive growth of school resource officers.131 Chris L. certainly was not the stimulus for
this development. The prominent school shootings of 1997 and Columbine led many

128

IDEA Regulations Commentary, 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,631 (Mar. 12, 1999); see also Senator Harkin’s
discussion of the amendments at note 97, supra.
129
Trent N., 569 N.W.2d at 724 (“We see no reason to conclude that these authorities will abandon their
statutory duties to exercise their discretion in a fair and impartial manner, always bearing in mind the best interests
of the child. And should such discretion be misused, it is always subject to the superintending authority of the
juvenile court.”).
130
School officials are often reluctant to pass along such information because of a fear that they will violate
FERPA. For example, a Tennessee school called the police to arrest an autistic child who had kicked and bitten
teachers when they tried to physically restrain him during an outburst. They did not inform the officers of the
disability or the child’s aversion to touching because they believed that FERPA prohibited sharing that information,
even in an emergency. Christina E. Sanchez, Autistic Boy’s Arrest at School Fuels Debate on Discipline for
Disabled, THE TENNESSEAN, March 29, 2009, at [?].
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communities to place sworn officers in the schools to patrol and to handle incidents that
school officials refer to them. These officers are frequently called on to intervene in behavioral
problems exhibited by students, especially those with disabilities. Although ostensibly
independent of school officials, anecdotal stories suggest that many of these officers hew to
directives from school principals and do not serve as independent safeguards on the issue of
what constitutes a crime.132 As to juvenile court supervision, judges often “encourage
referrals” because they believe that court supervision (and threatened sanctions) are the only
hope for “troubled” children.133

Unfortunately, courts have not so far found in the IDEA a significant obstacle to the
exclusion of children with disabilities, even where (as in Chris L.) the school’s own failures
caused the behavior being reported,134 and even where the school’s subjective intention was
to exclude the child. The following quote from a West Virginia hearing officer epitomizes the
problem:
Sadly, the school district’s strong desire to criminalize this child with a disability is
abundantly clear and disturbing. The teacher threw herself into the student’s space
when he was not hurting anybody, resulting in her being kicked and stomped. Before
the teacher even reported the April incident to her principal, she first excused herself to
call the state police to begin the juvenile court process. . . . Although the school
district’s desire to criminalize this student [for behaviors that are a manifestation of his
131

See National Association School Resource Officers (NASRO), at http://nasro.mobi/cms/index.php (last
visited July 24, 2009).
132
NYCLU, Safety With Dignity, supra note 3. See Paul J. Hirschfield, Preparing For Prison?The
Criminalization of School Discipline in the USA, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 79, 79 (2008) (“American
schools increasingly define and manage the problem of student discipline through a prism of crime control.”); See
generally, Sally Engle Merry, The Criminalization of Everyday Life, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE
CASES 14 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (“The criminalization of everyday life–the redefining of customary
practices as crimes–takes shape on a rhetorical terrain of threatened violence, disorder, and danger on which
expanded legal regulation promises dominant groups security and control.” Id. at 15).
133
“It might be expected that juvenile court judges would discourage school referrals to the juvenile justice
system practices if for no other reason than concern about increase in case loads taxing the limited-resource system
of the courts. Yet many judges tolerate and even encourage referrals because of their belief that referral is the only
way to get “help” for troubled youngsters.” APA Report, supra note 118, at 78.
134
E.g., Guntersville City Bd. of Educ., 47 IDELR at 118. The issue of lack of intent, a prerequisite to
criminal prosecution, is a defense that deserves more serious consideration in the context of cases such as this one.
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disabilities] is unfortunate, . . . the school district and the teacher may pursue such
charges if they choose to do so. IDEA Section 615(k)(6)(A). . . .

IV.

REASSESSING

A.

Complexities

Poverty or public interest lawyers who practice in settings where client crises, coupled
with limited resources, are the norm often ask: when do we choose to use the existing rules to
achieve short-term gain and when do we engage with allies on more systemic levels? More
frequently, the question is how do we do both? These lawyers discuss innovative direct
service strategies such as case aggregation, institutional targeting, focused priorities, and
other methods designed to connect casework with broader community struggles. They also
consider—or should—basic transformations in the structure and methods of their practices.
As difficult as this change is to imagine for many lawyers, it is important for them to assess
their genuine satisfaction with their current case practices and to engage in thought
experiments about the evolving models of community lawyers that have emerged during the
last decade.135 Such change is hard, and the paths toward a more strategic practice are strewn
with professional and political difficulties. As Chris L. shows, individual cases, those not
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See, e.g., PENDA HAIR, LOUDER THAN WORDS: LAWYERS, COMMUNITIES AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE (2001); Sameer M. Ashar, Public Interest Lawyers and Resistance Movements, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1879
(2007); Susan D. Bennett, Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, and Training in the
Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469 (2002); Symposium, Lawyering for Poor Communities in the TwentyFirst Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (1998); Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s Reflections on
Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297 (1996); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking:
Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407
(1995); William F. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship
in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099 (1994); Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering:
Toward a New Public Interest Practice, 1 PUB. INT. L. J. 49 (1991) (social justice collaboratives); Lucie E. White,
Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157
(1994).
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litigated with law reform as an express goal–can have long-term legal and political
ramifications. The case personifies how an issue can transform from a case to a cause.136

Is Chris L. a story of success or failure? Any case that galvanizes lawyers the way
Chris L. did inevitably has many dimensions. Unpacking those dimensions is a polycentric
task. Yet to shrink from this type of self-critical analysis robs others both of precious history
and rare glimpses into the low-visibility work of lawyering. This proclivity for self-critique
infuses the “steady work” that Gary Bellow urged; it is imperative both to engage in and to
examine legal work to understand its potential for social change.137

On a conventional level, Chris L. glowingly accomplished several goals. First, and
many practitioners believe foremost, the stated goals of the clients were achieved. Chris
almost immediately received acceptable educational services; in time the juvenile petition was
dismissed; and Mike L. was reimbursed for his legal fees. The case also served as a vehicle
for Mike L. to vindicate his belief that Chris had been treated unfairly and to show Chris that
he would go to great lengths to back him up.

B.

Contradictions

Rules, rights, and roles force lawyers to take sides. The IDEA is one of the last of the
entitlement statutes. It is the zenith of legalization. The decision to litigate this case, though
tempered by an attempt to settle the case at the inception, may have narrowed the field of

136

See generally Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109 (1993-94).
137
Bellow, supra note 132.
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vision.138 To alter this school system’s systemic practice of criminalization, mobilizing the
local and statewide disability advocacy groups to combat the problem of criminalization might
have yielded more permanent results or at least shaped the thinking of school authorities to be
more sensitive to the rights of students with disabilities?139 But such a massive undertaking
from an individual case simply cannot be mounted without a broader alliance of concerned
parents, advocacy groups, and other sympathetic interests. It is often hard to reconcile a
lawyer’s primary obligation to an individual client with broader law reform aims.

In Chris L., the lawyers advocated with a passion.140 Using concepts of narrative
theory, Chris was described as a small, troubled child, neglected by a school system that
discriminated against students with disabilities. He faced, the narrative went, a dysfunctional,
punitive juvenile court system.141 The school system painted the same picture, but more
grotesquely.142 Was this fair to Chris and other students with disabilities?

138

Minow, supra note 13, at 370 (“fabricated categories assume the reality of immutable reality”).
A major short-coming of situating legal practices more in the community is the practical reality that
private practitioners can only recover attorney’s fees if they prevail in litigation. A substantial portion of community
legal needs are met by solo or small firm practitioners. These lawyers can ill-afford to spend generous time
conducting community education or community organizing campaigns. An innovative project that endeavored to
formulate new models of community practice networks, with support from law schools, was the Law School
Consortium Project. Law School Consortium Project, at http://www.lawschoolconsortium.net (last visited July 15,
2009).
140
Myles Horton, the founder of the Highlander Research and Education Center, a venerable grassroots
school for social justice advocates, said about lawyers: “If all you have is a hammer, the only thing you see is nails.”
See generally MYLES HORTON & PAULO FREIRE, WE MAKE THE ROAD BY WALKING: CONVERSATIONS ON
EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1990). For advocacy of a multi-faceted approach to special education
lawyering, including community organizing and alliance-building, see Stephen A. Rosenbaum, When It’s Not
Apparent: Some Modest Advice to Parent Advocates for Students with Disabilities, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 159, 185-193 (2001). For advocacy of broad alliance-building in the context of the larger disability rights
movement, see Michael S. Wald, Comment, Moving Forward, Some Thoughts on Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 473, 475 (2000).
141
See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).
142
See MINOW, supra note 13, at 36-38 (on labeling). See also Colleen M. Fairbanks, Labels, Literacy,
and Enabling Learning: Glenn’s Story, 62 HARV. EDUC. REV. 475 (1992).
139
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Second, the claims made by the school system about the deleterious effects of the
“dual system” of discipline and the unfairness of the application of the anti-discrimination
principle in the context of this case had strong public appeal.143 The former argument was
designed to divide the regular education community and the special education community.
This was an exercise of control and power designed to stifle collective dissent and action.144

The rhetoric was appealing: special education children, such as Chris, were being
accorded more favorable treatment than non-special education students based on differences
that are socially constructed.145 The school system proclaimed that immunity from discipline
and the extra resources accorded students with mental and emotional disorders were
siphoning off money and energy from the education of the majority of students.146 To be sure,
the contraction of the virtually unconstrained disciplinary prerogatives that schools had
enjoyed for years before the IDEA caused internal anxiety within school systems,147 but

143

See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 28, at 102-111. For criticism of Kelman and Lester’s application of
the anti-discrimination principle to students with learning disabilities, see Andrew Weis, Book Review: Jumping to
Conclusions in “Jumping the Queue,” 51 STAN. L. REV. 183, 218 (1998) (“Kelman and Lester’s book is flawed
fatally because they have chosen to ignore the perspectives of their own subjects.”).
144
See Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering, Power, and Reform: The Legal Campaign to Abrogate the Broadform
Mineral Deed, 66 TENN. L. REV. 167 (1999). See generally JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK (1985).
145
AD/HD is a neuro-biological disorder, considered a chronic illness by the American Medical Association.
Council on Scientific Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n, Diagnosis and Treatment of Attention Deficit-Hyper Activity
Disorder in Children and Adolescents, 279 JAMA 1100, 1005 (1998); Karen R. Stern, Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, Fact Sheet: A Treatment Study of Children With Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder (2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200120.pdf (children with AD/HD at higher
risk of engaging in delinquent and anti-social behavior – describing prominent treatment modalities). See also
Gerald A. Gioia & Peter K. Isquith, New Perspectives on Educating Children with AD/HD: Contributions of the
Executive Functions, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 124 (2002).
146
See Gregory F. Corbitt, Comment, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education Finance: Does
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Violate a General Education Student’s Right to Education?, 40
B.C. L. REV. 633 (1998-99); Bruce Meredith & Julie Underwood, Irreconcilable Differences? Defining the Rising
Conflict Between Regular and Special Education, 24 J.L. & EDUC. 195 (1995).
147
See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 28, at 130; Wade F. Horn & Douglas Tynan, Revamping Special
Education, 144 PUB. INT. 36, 50 (2001) (arguing that students with behavioral disorders who qualify for special
education become accustomed to a “lower” standard of behavior).
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studies have concluded that the tensions caused in some school systems by differential
discipline procedures have not interfered in the orderly management of schools.148

What about the school system’s story? Why did it decide to draw a line in the sand
and litigate this case to the end? Were the central office administrators who made that
decision pressured by principals and teachers who authentically believed that the dual standard
of discipline was interfering with their ability to educate? Was this pressure at least in part
animated by lack of knowledge about behavioral disabilities such as AD/HD? How much
disability bias was operating?

Other parties whose views figure into this complex landscape include the Juvenile
Judge and his staff. Although the Juvenile Judge submitted an affidavit in the district court on
behalf of the schools, it was fairly tepid. He did not engage in strong turf protection.
Otherwise, the original trial date would not have been allowed to pass so readily. How
chagrined were the Judge and his staff at the prospect that the school system would be
compelled to formulate appropriate consequences for misconduct of this sort? Because
students with behavioral disorders compose a disproportionately high percentage of children
prosecuted in juvenile courts, did the Judge and his staff see the case as a sentinel for lawyers
to press more penetrating and time-consuming disability-based defenses for juvenile

148

See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STUDENT DISCIPLINE: INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01210.pdf.
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defendants?149 This is an outcome that has gained strong momentum in recent years, thanks to
the attention paid to the phenomenon of the “school-to-prison-pipeline.”150

IV.

A NEW EPILOGUE

Whatever the answers to these questions, the story is not over.151 With the growing
recognition of the school-to-prison pipeline, there is an opportunity to remake the law that
has grown since Chris L.. The time for a re-imagined analysis is ripe.

The cramped interpretation of the IDEA that allows schools to refer for any conduct
that they believe might fall under some portion of the criminal code, though common, should
be rethought. The referral provision in (k)(6), as the Department of Special Education
realized, was not inconsistent with prior case law.152 Chris L. did not hold that schools could
not report crimes to police, and the 1997 Amendments cannot fairly be said to have
responded to Chris L.. Instead, (k)(6) responded to an unfounded fear that schools would be
unable to protect student safety in an emergency because of cumbersome procedural
requirements. Although Congress had not directly addressed the question of reporting
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KIM BROOKS ET AL., CHILDREN’S LAW CENTER, THE SPECIAL NEEDS OF YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PRACTICE 79-107 (2001) (competency, waiver of rights, and other
defenses), available at http://www.childrenslawky.org/publications/specialneedsofyouth.pdf.
150
See, e.g., supra note 3.
151
See, e.g., CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, TENNESSEE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SCHOOL CRIMES STUDY: A
STUDY OF OFFENSES, ARRESTEE AND VICTIM DATA REPORTED TO THE TENNESSEE INCIDENT BASED REPORTING
SYSTEM (2009) (documenting 12,379 offenses occurring at Tennessee schools in 2008, with the largest category
being 3,575 simple assaults); Philip J. Cook, Denise C. Gottfredson & Chongmin Na, School Crime Control and
Prevention (March 25, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1368292.
152
See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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crimes, no interpretation of IDEA prior to the 1997 Amendments would have prohibited
schools from calling police for assistance in proper circumstances.153

The referral provision in (k) (6) should not be interpreted in a crabbed manner because
that interpretation undermines the entire statutory scheme. IDEA reflects a careful balancing
of substantive goals and procedural mechanisms. As the Court explained in Honig, IDEA
was intended to remove the “unilateral discretion” that had previously been enjoyed by
schools in deciding whom to exclude. Unfortunately, the prevailing interpretation of (k) (6)
allows a school to enjoy that same degree of discretion once again. This interpretation
eviscerates the robust behavioral mandates contained in the statute.154 If a school’s discretion
is broad enough to have a child prosecuted for tapping his foot in class, then it must be
believed that Congress intended to undermine the goals of IDEA with a single, ambiguous
sentence—that it has hidden an elephant in a mousehole.155 This is an unlikely scenario.

The only interpretation of (k) (6) consistent with IDEA’s structure, and coincidentally,
consistent with its language, is as a substantive command that forbids exclusion except when a
child has committed a crime,156 and a procedural mechanism through which the substantive
command can be enforced. The question, then, is how to define a “crime” and how reviewing

153

This is why counterpart of (k)(6) in the Code of Federal Regulations is entitled “Rule of Construction.”
The provision did not change the IDEA in substance–it merely clarified that the “parade of horribles” feared by
school systems was not required by the statute.
154
For example, the IDEA requires the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports for students
whose behavior impedes the child’s learning or that of others. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(B)(3)(B)(i) (2004).
155
“Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.
457 (2001).
156
In other words, the negative implication of (k)(6)–that schools may not refer for “non-crimes”–is
compelled by the statute. The provision in (k)(6) must be read against the background of Honig, which clearly
prohibited schools from excluding children simply because they were manifesting their disabilities in ways that
violated codes of discipline.
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courts can ensure that schools have not “circumvented” their obligations by referring noncrimes.

In lieu of an unambiguous statement from Congress or a helpful administrative
elaboration,157 the line between “crime” and “circumvention” must be drawn by the courts.
Congress’ failure to provide clear boundaries does not negate its substantive command—that
schools may not circumvent their responsibilities by reporting non-crimes. Courts must take
seriously the difference between crimes and non-crimes. It does not seem beyond the capacity
of the judicial branch to recognize that foot tapping or profanity is, emphatically, not criminal
behavior.

Furthermore, there must be some meaningful review of school referral decisions,
backed up by remedial authority. Where hearing officers and district courts are asked to

157

OSERS has taken some abortive steps toward such an elaboration, but its guidance remains ambiguous.
See FAQ B-1. [Reproduce text]. This guidance suggests that “crimes” include only those infractions for which
schools are required to report under mandatory state reporting laws. However, it can just as easily be read to mean
that crimes include at least those sorts of infractions, but are not limited to them. It is possible to draw a definition
of “crime” by reference to state law in three different ways. First, as the OSERS guidance suggests, is by reference
to the state’s mandatory reporting statutes. For example, in Tennessee, a school is required to report to law
enforcement a reasonable suspicion that a student has committed (1) a violation of one of several criminal statutes
prohibiting possession of drugs or weapons on school grounds, TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-209, or (2) an assault,
battery, or vandalism on school property endangering life, health, or safety. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4301. The
latter statute furthermore prohibits reporting to police of “any fight not involving the use of a [dangerous] weapon .
. . [or] resulting in serious personal injury . . . .” The OSERS guidance suggests that these are the “crimes” that
may be reported under IDEA § 1415(k)(6). Alternatively, it is possible to define “crime” by reference to the
statutes governing juvenile courts. State statutes will differ, but Tennessee’s are typical; they provide for two
categories of juvenile offenses. Those categories are: (1) “unruly” or “status” offenses—i.e., those that would not
be criminal if committed by an adult, including truancy and habitual disobedience, and (2) “delinquency”
offenses—i.e., those that would be criminal if committed by an adult. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-102(b)(9),
102(b)(23)(A)(iii). Defining “crime” by reference to these statutes would command the conclusion that schools
may not report “unruly” behavior because it is not “criminal.”
Finally, an argument is possible under Tennessee law that neither delinquency nor unruly offenses are reportable as
“crimes” unless they may be transferred to the state criminal courts. Tennessee law provides that the juvenile
courts are intended to “remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the
consequences of criminal behavior . . . .” TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-101. In other words, offenses in the sole
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts are simply not “crimes.” The only reportable offenses in Tennessee, therefore,
would be those in which the student was over 16 at the time the offense was committed or, if the student was not
over 16, serious offenses such as rape, robbery, or kidnapping. See TENN CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-103 (exclusive
original jurisdiction of juvenile court) and 37-1-134 (transfer of cases to criminal court).
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review school referrals (or referrals by their agents158) that result in juvenile prosecutions, they
must have the authority to enjoin the school to withdraw those petitions.159 Perhaps more
importantly, where the juvenile justice process has been independently initiated by police or
prosecutors, juvenile court judges should subpoena all pertinent records with respect to the
disability. The school should also be required to conduct a manifestation determination along
the same timeline as it would have if the student had not been referred.160 That determination
should also be provided to the court. A key question for the court is whether the school’s
action or inaction contributed to the behavior. Where it has, the court should exercise its
authority to supervise the school’s progress in meeting the child’s needs in addition to
supervising the child’s progress.

Even where the school appears innocent, a full

understanding of the child’s difficulties may prompt the judge to fashion a less conventional
remedy.
Furthermore, recognition of a pattern of referrals may demonstrate a need for
collaborative programs. A juvenile court judge is peculiarly suited to facilitating
communication and collaboration among various stakeholders, school officials, police and
prosecutors, social workers, guardians ad litem, and others.161 One such program, initiated in
Clayton County, GA, has been remarkably successful. This program delineates the respective
responsibilities of the schools, the police, the juvenile court, and other stakeholders; unbridled
discretion is patently curbed. Under this protocol, school referrals dropped by almost 70%

158

This might include police, SROs, or prosecutors in a proper case.
This remedial power, exercised by the Chris L. Court, undoubtedly survived the 1997 Amendments.
160
As the court noted in Trent N., “[t]he school’s responsibility under the IDEA . . . does not end when a
child enters the juvenile justice system. . . . The school’s responsibility to the child is constant.” Trent N., 569
N.W.2d at 724.
161
Juvenile courts should screen out as many referrals as is warranted based on the understanding that federal
and state special education laws should be the presumptive vehicles for addressing misconduct by students with
disabilities.
159
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since 2004; juvenile detentions resulting from school referrals are down by 95%.162 Similar
Memoranda of Understanding, which concretely specify the roles and responsibilities of the
relevant actors, have also been promoted by the United States Department of Justice.163

V.

CONCLUSION

Chris L. stands as a determined effort by the courts that rendered the string of
favorable nonpunitive, disability-centered decisions in the case to breathe life into the meaning
of what Congress intended in enacting the IDEA. In the tradition of Honig v. Doe, Chris L.
represents a pragmatic recognition that the juvenile courts are unsuitable forums for handling
low-level misbehavior by students. The “hegemony” of the juvenile courts,164 and the schools
that uncritically rely on them and the police to enforce school discipline, was shaken by the
Chris L. litigation. Congress’ intervention in the issue was timebound and opaque. In today’s
climate of rethinking the fundamentals of school safety, educational adequacy, and school
discipline, the Chris L. case should be used as a beacon of reform.165 The path is there for
courts and legislatures166 to follow.
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See Juvenile Detention Alternative Strategies: Promoting Child Welfare Using Evidence-Based Practices,
http://www.childwelfarepolicycenters.com/page/page/2260730.htm (last visited July 24, 2009). Other promising
approaches to reducing school-based conflicts, ones that often lead to criminal referrals, are emerging. See, e.g.,
RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLYING IN SCHOOLS: PROBLEM-ORIENTED GUIDES FOR POLICE NO.
12, (2009); Jack Daniel, Amy Tillery & Denise Whitehead, Fresno’s Juvenile Behavioral Health Court: A Better
Way to Serve Youth, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 43 (2009).
163
See Department of Justice Model Memorandum of Understanding, available at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/cdroms/sroperfeval/guidepdfs/tool_1.pdf.
164
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 177 (Oxford
University Press 1999).
165
The tenability of the disability/nondisability paradigm is keenly explored in Stephen A. Rosenbaum,
Full SP[]ED Ahead: Expanding the IDEA Idea to Let All Students Ride the Same Bus, 4 STAN. J. CIV. RTS.
& CIV. LIBERTIES 373 (2008). Rosenbaum urges that inclusive educational practices should cover all at-risk
students, regardless whether they meet the constructed eligibility requirements of IDEA. This should be the
modern day lesson of Chris L.
166
In Tennessee, the Legislature infirmly sought to extend greater protections to students with disabilities
by allowing school systems to file a juvenile court petition against a student only after conducting a
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manifestation determination that demonstrates that the student’s triggering behavior was not caused by a
disability. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-10-1304(3)(B). This section, however, conflicts with Chris L., by
permitting the filing of petitions for noncrime status offenses, such as truancy, following a finding that the
behavior was not a manifestation of the student’s disability. In the IDEIA Amendments of 2004, Congress gave
school authorities substantial discretion to determine on a case-by-case basis whether to order a change of
placement for a child with a disability who violates a code of student conduct. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(K)(1)(A).
Since Chris L. was bottomed on a potential change of placement (to juvenile detention), this section could be
used to argue that school authorities should exercise the discretion conferred on them by this section before
referring any student with a disability to law enforcement officers.
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